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MILITARY = 217,000

|            |         |         |             |
|------------|---------|---------|-------------|
|            | Pro-GVN | Unknown | Disaffected |
| Leadership | 25%     | 25%     | 50%         |
| Troops     |         | UNKNOWN |             |

A considerable part of the leadership is disaffected and would welcome a change in government.

The loyalties of the troops are not known, but it could be assumed that the majority would follow their unit commanders.

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STUDENTS - University, 12,000 plus  
High School 170,000 plus

80% Unknown

20%  
Against

As long as there appears to be hope of overthrowing the Diem Government, the students will keep trying; if that hope should evaporate, the majority would likely return to political apathy, with important minorities turning toward neutralism or communism, and a very small minority seeking the material rewards of collaboration with the Diem Government.

There is some evidence that political parties such as the DAI Viet and VNQDD have some influence among students. There is also evidence of at least limited communist influence.

The five major student groups, of which all but the last are anti-GVN, are:

- A) The Buddhist Student Association(BSA) which claims some 3,000 members. However, the GVN has arrested or neutralized much of the top leadership. Therefore, the BSA is disorganized, but its membership is collaborating with other student groups.
- B) The Catholic Student Association which has 1-2000 members.
- C) The Volunteer Youth Association(VYA) is small and was relatively apolitical until after 21 August. Since that time its members have become more active in anti-government activities.
- D) The Inter-Faculty Liaison Committee (IFLC) which coordinates small student political groups and activities.
- E) The National Union of Vietnamese Students (NUVS). This is a GVN control mechanism and has little membership.

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PEASANTS - 10,000,000

Pro-GVN  
10%

No Opinion

Disaffected  
10%

Many peasants are anti-government, but not necessarily anti-Diem. They are anti-government primarily because government represents the unpleasant controls of society such as police and taxes. In general, the Peasant would prefer to be left alone to pursue his livelihood. The Peasant does not constitute a significant political entity, but his support or non-support of any GVN is important to the successful prosecution of the war.

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Buddhists -

3,000,000

90%

10%

Unknown

Disaffected

The Buddhists were not a cohesively disaffected unit prior to 8 May 1963. However, GVN repressive actions since that time have encouraged the majority to rally 'round the flag of anti-Diemism. In addition, many Vietnamese who were not particularly strong Buddhists have now become supporters of the faith, primarily because of the GVN's persecution of the Buddhist leadership.

Buddhist leaders would undoubtedly welcome a change in government, but active and organized Buddhist support for a coup remains doubtful.

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BUREACRACY - 150,000

PRO-GVN  
50%

UNKNOWN  
40%

DISAFFECTED  
10%

For the most part the bureacrats are probably unenthusiastic supporters of the government and the majority would probably be loath to bite the hand that feeds them. Discontent has increased during the past two months, but its depth and intensity, although not known, is not considered great.

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Organized Labor -

150,000

75%

25%

Unknown

Disaffected

GVN actions during the past five years to fragment and control the CVTC have alienated the majority of senior and middle-level trade union officials who number about 300. This bitterness toward the GVN has undoubtedly been communicated to considerable of the rank and file. The CVTC leadership appears to have fairly tight control over the rank and file. Union members would probably participate or not participate in a coup effort depending on the guidance of their leaders.

CVTC President Tran Quoc Buu has long tried to keep the CVTC at least an unenthusiastic supporter of the GVN. However, there is now evidence to indicate that he is ready to entertain opposition proposals and this readiness on his part will probably increase if and when it becomes apparent that Diem and Nhu can no longer control Vietnam's destiny.


Organized labor in Saigon, which numbers about 35,000, is generally disaffected and could be a major factor during a coup crisis as the CVTC controls workers in many of the crucial industries such as the Water and Electricity Company, bus and transport, railroad, and petroleum.

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Dai Viet Party ~~SECRET~~

1. Over the years, various members of the Dai Viet Party have been mentioned as being engaged in coup plotting against the regime; most of these reports appear to be based more on supposition than on factual evidence, this supposition stemming from the fact that the Dai Viet Party is reputed to be well organized and well disciplined.



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There would also be Buddhist and student representation in this provisional government. There is also available a summary platform outlining the intentions of the group. There is no evidence as to how this group would propose to install itself in power, as there is no reporting whatsoever on its military backing other than the generals named above.




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
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




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


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
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
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